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ABSTRACT
A time series cross sectional analysis of 18 successful later
entrants in 8 categories of consumer packaged goods over the period
from October 1983 to January 1988 confirms previous empirical
findings that after correcting for differences in marketing effort
and product quality, later entrants suffer a long term market share
disadvantage. New evidence of the penalties associated with later
entry are found in statistical estimation of models of cumulative
trial, first repeat, and subsequent repeat purchasing.
Significantly lower asymptotic levels are found in both trial and
repeat behavior. However based on this data, the rate of approach
of later entrants to their lower asymptotic performance measures is
either equal to or faster than early entrants and provides evidence
of a compensating partial effect accrued by later entrants.
__ __
INTRODUCTION
This paper expands the empirical base of knowledge on the
effects of order of entry in the frequently purchased consumer
products industry. A cross sectional analysis of market shares in
package goods by Urban et a (1986) found persistent share
advantages for pioneers -- later entrants had systematically lower
long term market shares. The analysis reported here extends this
previous study in three important ways. First, a cross sectional
and time series data base is used to examine the dynamic effects of
later entry. This allows one o address the question, do later
entrants approach their asymptotic share at a slower or faster rate
than pioneers? Second, this study examines the effects of order of
entry on trial penetration and repeat purchases as well as share.
Third, the use of UPC scanner data allows analysis of price,
promotion, and distribution effects which were not included in the
original cross sectional analysis by Urban et al.
Many theoretical economic (e.g. Schmalensee 1982) and
behavioral (e.g. Carpenter and Nakamoto 1989) explanations have
been given for order of entry advantages. We will not establish
the behavioral causes for pioneering advantage in this work, but we
will provide empirical evidence on purchase dynamics which can aid
in the construction of a theory of entry advantage and the design
of behavioral experiments to test it. For a more complete
literature review see Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) and Robinson
(1988).
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In this paper we describe the structures for dynamic models
for share, trial penetration, and repeat purchasing and then
discuss their measurement and estimation. Next we present the
empirical results and the implications of our study. We close with
the identification of future research needs.
MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Market Share
We model overall market share in each period by an underlying
share growth pattern which is modified by order of entry,
distribution, price, promotion, advertising, and product quality
effects. We posit that the underlying share will grow at a
decreasing marginal rate to an asymptote. The growth is described
by an exponential function which depends on the order of entry of
the brand. All variables except order of entry are expressed as
ratios to the first brand to enter the category. The formal
equation is:
i It t it Mt Ait Pi (oeft(b/)t) (1)
Sit = Ratio of share of ith brand to share of first brand to enter
the category as of period t
Ei = Order of entry of ith brand
Dit= Ratio of distribution of ith brand to distribution of first
brand in period t
Pit = Ratio of price of ith brand to price of first brand in period
t
Mi = Ratio of promotion of ith brand to promotion of first brand
in period t
2
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Ait = Ratio of advertisement of ith brand to advertisement of first
brand in period t
Qi = Ratio of quality of ith brand to quality of first brand in
period t
i = Brand
t = Time period since the introduction of brand
,I,y,6,8,8,,E, = Parameters
We have suppressed a category subscript for notational simplicity.
Underlying Share Growth: The underlying market share for later
entrants to enter a category relative to the pioneer is described
by (1 - e-t). Figure 1 shows the typical underlying share pattern
in a market as entry occurs. Initially the pioneer has OO percent of the
market but los-es share as the second brand enters. We assume that
the second brand's share grows at decreasing rate over time and
approaches an asymptote. When the second brand enters, a discrete
change takes place in the curve describing the pioneer because
shares in the market must add to 100%. Similarly when the third
brand enters, the share curves for the first and second entrants
undergo a discrete change as the third entrant's share grows
asymptotically. These curves are not smooth exponential functions,
but if we assume that the third entrant takes share from brands one
and two in a manner proportional to their shares, we obtain the
desired smoothness in the share ratios of equation 1. This is the
constant ratio model assumption of competitive interaction and it
has the attractive property in our case that when we ratio the
share of the i th brand to enter the market to the first entrant in
the category, the curves of relative share versus time become
3
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smooth and are consistent with our model of underlying share
growth.1
One reason why we ratio the i th brand share to the first
brand to enter the category is now evident, but another reason
results from our desire to estimate equation 1 with time series and
cross sectional data. Ratios allow reasonable comparisons across
categories with different numbers of brands. In a three brand as
well as in a two brand category we posit that the share ratio will
be the same between the second and first entrants even though the
absolute share may be very different (e.g. 40% vs. 60% in a two
brand market and 33.3% vs 50% in a three brand market). A third
reason is that the ratios are an appropriate way of eliminating
cross category differences in marketing instruments, e.g., some
categories have higher prices or promotional or advertisement
expenditures and others ave lower levels.
Share Growth and Asymptotic Effects for Later Entrants: The sub-
model of underlying growth in share ratios described above
(1 - et) is extended in equation 1 to allow the asymptotic level
and the growth rate to the asymptote to be different for later
entrants. The asymptotic effect is modeled by a mutiplicative
factor (E4). This allows the asymptote to be lower for later
entrants if a < 0 or higher if a > 0.
The effect of order of entry on the rate of growth in share is
1 If the share of i th entrant (i greater than 2) is S 'and S1'
and S'are the shares of the first and second entrants before entry
of the i th brand, the ratio of the second to first entrant after
entry is S2/S1 = (S2'/(1 + Si))/(S1,'/( + Si)) = S2'/S1'.
4
·
modeled through the multiplicative factor and by adding an
additional exponential term. The multiplicative effect Ea changes
the growth rate because it effects each period's share estimate.
When a is less than zero this component of the growth rate as well
as the asymptote are lowered and vice versa. The additional
exponential term is -(?/Ei)t and it increases the growth rate in
share if is greater than zero and decreases it if is less than
zero. When we divide the growth parameter by the order of entry
we are assuming that this component of the growth effect is smaller
for later entrants whether the effect is to increase or decrease
the growth rate. When examining the effect of later entrants
versus earlier entrants in this exponential term we must consider
-the effect of /E i for E = i and i + 1 where i is greater than or
equal to two. If is greater than zero the entry effect is a
hiTher growth rate for all later entrants but the not as much
higher for entrant i + 1 as for i, so the later entrant i + 1 is
growing at a slower rate relative to entrant i. If is less than
zero the entry effect is lower growth for all later entrants but
not as much lower for entrant i + 1 as for i, so the later entrant
i + 1 has a faster growth than entrant i. The total growth rate
must be assessed by the combination of the components for the
specific values of the parameter estimates (a, , and ).
Effects of Marketing Variables: The effects of changes in
distribution, price, promotion, advertising, and quality are
modeled as multiplicative effects where each variable of the i th
entry is defined as a ratio to the pioneer's level for the variable
5
and raised to an exponent. This multiplicative form allows for
nonlinear response and interaction effects between the variables.
Major introductory campaigns that induce large trial sales are
captured by the multiplicative promotion and advertising terms
which are multiplied times the basic growth term. After he
introductory campaign is finished the sales will be dominated by
the underlying growth effects.
The model in equation 1 includes the critical asymptotic and
dynamic share effects for order of entry and it can represent
complex share patterns such as increases in share above the
underlying growth rate by heavy promotion and advertising and then
a share reduction as the trial stimulators are withdrawn and share
growth renews due to repeat purchasing.2
Trial Penetration Model
We model trial penetration analogously to share. Underlying
trial penetration is the fraction of the market who has ever tried
a brand and typically this measure of trial displays asymptotic
growth. We model order effects on the rate of growth and
asymptotic level. Controllable variables of distribution,
promotion, price, advertising, and quality modify this underlying
growth in penetration.
2 Equation 1 has no constant (K) because we want to preserve
for the case where only one brand is in the market the asymptotic
property of the share ratio being 1. With only one brand all the
independent ratios will be one and the share ratio will be one only
if K is not included or its value is 1.
6
T Ea./ DP P M A (* (2)Tit 1 it it it it i
Tit = Ratio of cumulative penetration of ith brand to first brand
in category
Repeat Purchasing Model
The cumulative percent of those who tried who ever repeat is
modeled similarly to share and trial penetration with order effects
on underlying repeat purchasing and marketing variables as
modifiers of the underlying pattern.
,, a M~ll A (3)
i Dt t it Ait (3
Rit = Ratio of cumulative percent of triers who repeat by period t
for ith brand to first brand in category
We also use this same form to model additional purchases after
trial and first repeat. The cumulative number of additional repeat
purchases per person who had repeated once after a trial purchase
is used as the dependent variable in the same model form as
described in equation 3.
MEASUREMENT AND ESTIMATION
Data
The data used in this study are based on UPC measures in eight
markets for share, trial penetration, repeat purchases,
distribution, price, and promotion supplied by Information
7
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Resources Inc.3 Advertising expenditure data was obtained from
Leading National Advertisers. We found 28 new brand entrants
across 8 frequently purchased categories over a time span of 220
weeks. We selected categories where new brand entrants (not new
variants of existing brands) were present and at least 52 weeks of
data were available for the new brand. Categories included tartar
control toothpaste, hi-fiber cereals, frozen orange drink, frozen
pineapple juice, wine coolers, microwave popcorn, gel toothpaste,
and ibuprofen pain relievers. Two brands achieved measurable share
and then fell to approximately zero sales levels (the second
entrant in wine coolers and the fourth in microwave popcorn). We
omitted these brands from the statistical analysis but kept them in
the order of entry count for the category. If we had included
them, their low sales levels would have overstated the penalties
for late entry that successful brands would experience. Eight of
the remaining 26 successful entrants were first entrants. Across
the 18 successful later entrants there were 1241 weekly
observations or on average 69 weeks per entry.
Measures
The raw UPC store and panel measures were used directly or
manipulated to correspond to the definitions in equation 1. Market
3 We would like to acknowledge and thank Information Resources
Inc. for providing this data to us. The 8 cities represent IRI
BEHAVIORSCAN ® cities. The data includes store scanner records
from over 75 supermarkets and 25 drug stores as well as panel
records from over 2500 respondents in each market. Data from
October 31, 1983 to January 15, 1988 were available.
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share is obtained directly from the IRI weekly data reports and is
ratioed to the first entrant to provide the dependent measure S in
equation 1. Order of entry (E) is not completely defined in the
UPC data. For brands that entered in our 220 week span of UPC
data, the order of entry of each brand was obtained by observing
the week in which the brand first appeared in the UPC store data.
In cases where existing brands entered the market before the
beginning of our data (October 31, 1983), we interviewed brand
managers in the respective category and reviewed trade publications
(Advertising Age and Marketing News) to determine order of earlier
entrants.
Distribution in the IRI data is measured by the occurrence of
some sales movement in a store over a week. The percent
distribution is the proportion of the stores recording sales of the
brand weighted by the volume of that store relative to the total
market volume. This "all commodity weighted volume" measure is
used as the distribution variable in the ratio D.
Suggested retail price is not reported directly in the UPC
reports but can be derived from the weekly reported check out
prices per unit volume (these include promotion effects) by
considering the IRI measures of "deal volume percentage" (average
percent of volume purchased on any deal) and "promotional price
cut" (the average percentage of suggested price cut per unit volume
of purchase). The check out price is suggested price weighted by
the deal volume percentage and promotional price cut:
9
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(4)
Pt = Pit (-Lit) + Lit PI (-Cit)
where
PCit = Check out price per unit volume
Pit = Suggested price per unit volume
Lit = Deal volume percentage
Cit = Promotional price cut
and the suggested price is therefore:
(5)
Pit = Pt / (l-Lit Ci=)
The dollar promotional expenditure is constructed from the
deal volume percentage and promotional price cut variables.
(6)
Mit = Pit Cit Vit Lit
where
Mit = Promotional expenditure for a brand at period t
Vit = Unit volume sales at time period t
Advertising expenditure from Leadin National Advertisers is
based on audits of seven media (magazines, newspapers, newspaper
supplements, network television, spot television, network radio,
outdoor, and cable TV). The ratio of the nth entrant to the first
entrant (A) is calculated from the reported magnitudes. The
absolute magnitude of this measure is not required in this model so
we need only assume that the audit data is correctly representing
the relative expenditures. Advertising is the last measure required
in the share model equation 1.
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Dependent measures of trial and repeat for equations 2 and 3
were obtained directly from IRI panel reports. n contrast to the
share data which was available weekly, the trial and repeat data
were available only on a five week basis. The price and promotion
variables were aggregated to the five week interval for the trial
and repeat calculations, but in other respects the independent
variable for equations 2 and 3 were defined as above. The total
number of five week observations for later entrants was 330 or 18
five week periods per entry on average.
Two repeat measures were available. Equation 3 represents one
of them -- cumulative number of triers who repeat by period t. The
second measure is the number of "repeat purchases per repeater" or
the number of purchases in the panel that reflect the second or
higher repeat purchases divided by the number of people who have
repeated at least once at time t. In the results section we report
the use of both measures as dependent measures of repeat
purchasing.
Limitation and Strengths
One variable is missing from our measures -- product quality
(Q). In the Urban et. al. (1986) a constant sum preference measure
was available based on survey measures from pretest market
research, but in our case such measures were not available. To
compensate in part for this limitation, a dummy variable to
represent quality will be estimated statistically.
Despite this limitation, the data base is attractive because
11
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it measures not only share but also trial and repeat behavior,
includes price, promotion, and distribution variables, and reports
store level marketing activity on a weekly basis.
Estimation
The share, trial, and repeat models developed above are
nonlinear time series cross sectional models from the estimation
point of view. We linearize the basic terms of equations 1,2, and
3 by taking logs of both sides of them. Because we do not have a
quality measure in our data base we use a brand specific constant
(Q) to account for quality and other variations unique to the
brand. In the log-log versions of the equations the term
(1-e-*t(/E)t) represents the dynamics. We employ nonlinear least
squares estimation methods (SYSNLIN OLS in SAS) to estimate the
coefficients.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The statistical results of estimating the share, trial
penetration, and repeat equations are shown in Table 1. The fits
are good with R squared values in the range of .81 to .93 and the
correlations of actual to predicted in the range of .97 and .89.
The share and trial models show the best fits.
In the share, trial, cumulative repeat, and repeat per
repeater models the alpha parameter is negative and significant at
the five percent level in all cases. This indicates that later
entrants achieved lower asymptotic performance. Order of entry
12
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Table 1: Share Trial and Repeat Model .: Itimation Results
Parameters (t)
Asymptotic Entry (a)
Distribution ()
Suggested Price ()
Promotion Dollars (6)
Advertising Expenditure ()
Constant ()
Rate of Growth ()
Brand Specific Constants:
Brand 1
Brand 2
Brand 3
Brand 4
Brand 5
Brand 6
Brand 7
Brand 8
Brand 9
Brand 10
Brand 11
Brand 12
Share Trial
Estimates
Cumrep
Repeat
-0.19242
(-2.69)***
0.14745
(1.39)
-0.39650
(2.74)***
-0.05770
(-2.54)**
0.00453
(0.43)
0.64141
(4.09)***
-1.02640
(-3.04)***
-0.14983
(-0.74)
-0.68310
(-3.02)***
-0.97308
(-3.95)***
-0.27177
(-1.26)
-0.39639
(-14.02)***
0.69832
(13.74)***
-0.30987
(-8.18)***
0.32972
(30.97)***
0.03703
(6.71)***
2.92505
(1.94)*
-5.63811
(-1.87)*
-0.42088
(-7.45)***
-1.11144
(-13.38)***
-0.85077
(-8.57)***
-0.33686
(-4.67)***
0.02670
(0.40)
0.49094
(5.58)***
-0.82766
(-8.71)***
-0.45605
(-7.25)***
-0.67243
(-7.61)***
0.39481
(4.49)***
0.30934
(3.59)***
0.35853
(4.14)***
-0.50603
(-7.54)***
0.69423
(7.02)**
-0.02836
(-0.21)
0.17497
(8.18)* * *
0.02745
(2.71)***
0.50871
(2.34)**
-0.18045
(-0.28)
-0.85134
(-5.86) **
-1.77551
( -8.44)***
-1.58395
(-6.87)***
-1.21115
(-5.90)***
1.11331
(9.58)***
0.01315
(0.08)
-1.07723
(-4.56)***
0.87590
(7.08)***
-1.04946
( -5.38)***
1.75289
(11.80)***
1.51696
(10.37)***
1.33961
(7.68)***
Repper
-0.10240
(-2.26)**
0.17307
(2.50)**
-0.27095
(2.09)**
0.01062
(0.74)
-0.01116
(-1.65)*
0.34911
(4.50)***
-0.27095
(-1.33)
-1.00591
(-9.28)***
-1.82243
(-12.28)***
-3.09808
(-9.90)***
-1.47906
(-10.57)***
0.36102
(4.45)***
-0.83335
(-7.10)***
-1.84406
(-11.12)***
-0.38543
(-4.72)***
-1.53269
(-10.77)***
0.66871
(6.75)***
0.35939
(3.62)***
0.28759
(2.42)**
-0.40288
(-2.84)***
-0.07796
(-0.43)
-0.56647
(-2.25)**
-0.78589
(-5.98)***
-1.03058
(-4.85)***
0.58704
(3.69)***
0.26032
(1.65)*
0.36920
(2.00)**
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Brand 13 -0.28596 1.26679 0.46003 -0.06205
(-2.66)' ' (6.57)*** (2.24)' (-0.48)
Brand 14 0.53459 1.48551 1.04443 0.42889
(6.08)*t ' (7.13)"* (4.40)t ' (3.02)***
Brand 15 -0.78833 -0.79877 -0.25990 -0.15906
(-13.77) m' (-5.92)*** (-1.82)* (-1.78)*
Brand 16 -0.61924 -0.97167 -4.03122 -1.00408
(-10.31)' (-6.55)*** (-24.91)'m* (-9.61)***
Brand 17 -0.32124 0.10011 0.19397 0.06890
(-8.32)m (1.09) (1.70)' (1.09)
Number of observations: 1241 333 330 316
R-Square: 0.9046 0.9327 0.8138 0.8814
Correlation between
actual & predicted 0.95 0.97 0.89 0.94
The "T" ratio values are shown in the parentheses. CINREP and REPPER refer to repeat wLoeels with cumulative repeaters as a
percent of triers and average additional receats per repeater as the respective dependent measures.
*Significant at the 10X level
**Significant at the 5X Level
***Significant at the 1% level
14
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penalties are found in not only trial, but also in repeat behavior.
The share model asymptotic result confirms previous work (Urban et.
al., 1986) but is smaller in magnitude (-.4 in this study versus -
.49 in the Urban et. al. study). The trial and repeat estimates
provide new evidence to suggest that order of entry penalties will
occur in trial and repeat behavior when all other variables are
equal. The order effect is observed on both first repeat and
subsequent repeat purchases by those who have repeat purchased
once. The market reward evident in share is the result of first
mover advantages in all phases of the purchase sequence.
The effects of the ultiplicative and exponential growth
parameters (a, , ) can be most easily interpreted by the values
in table 2 which show the overall growth progression of the share
ratio for second, third, and fourth entrants based on the estimated
pa ameters and the assumption that the price, promotion,
distribution, and advertising are equal to the first brand entry's
levels. The table shows the fraction of the asymptotic share ratio
achieved in each period as well as the magnitude of the share ratio
itself. The data in part a of table 2 indicates that the rate of
convergence to the asymptotic value is faster for entrant 3 than 2,
4 than 3, and 5 than 4. Later entrants approach their eventual
share levels faster than early entrants all else being equal.
However, the asymptotic values for later entrants are lower (see
15
Table 2: Share Growth for Later Entrants With Price, Promotion,
Advertising and Distribution Equal to Pioneer
a) Estimated Fraction of Symptotic Share Ratio Level Achieved at
Time t (Weeks)
Time
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Entry 2 Entry 3 Entry 4
0.100
0.550
0.700
0.775
0.820
0.850
0.871
0.887
0.900
0.910
0.918
0.925
0.930
0.935
0.940
0.943
0.648
0.824
0.882
0.912
0.929
0.941
0.949
0.956
0.960
0.964
0.968
0.970
0.972
0.974
0.976
0.978
0.780
0.890
0.926
0.945
0.956
0.963
0.968
0.972
0.975
0.978
0.980
0.981
0.983
0.984
0.985
0.986
Entry 5
0.834
0.917
0.944
0.958
0.966
0.972
0.976
0.979
0.981
0.983
0.984
0.986
0.987
0.988
0.988
0.989
b) Estimated Share Ratio Values Achieved at Time t (Weeks)
Entry 2 Entry 3 Entry 4 Entry 5
0.076
0.418
0.532
0.589
0.623
0.646
0.662
0.674
0.684
0.691
0.697
0.703
0.707
0.711
0.714
0.717
0.419
0.533
0.571
0.590
0.601
0.609
0.614
0.618
0.621
0.624
0.626
0.628
0.629
0.630
0.632
0.633
0.450
0.514
0.535
0.545
0.552
0.556
0.559
0.561
0.563
0.564
0.566
0.566
0.567
0.568
0.569
0.569
0.441
0.484
0.499
0.506
0.511
0.514
0.52 
0.527
0.518
0.519
0.520
0.521
0.521
0.522
0.522
0.523
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Time
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
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part b of table 2)4.
In the trial model the exponential growth parameter psi is not
significant so the null hypothesis of equal rates of growth to the
asymptote for later entrants cannot be rejected at the 10 percent
level. The later entrants would not achieve trial penetration
faster or slower than the earlier entrants, but they would achieve
lower levels of asymptotic trial penetration if all else were
equal. The trial penetration ratios are shown in table 3. In both
repeat measures (cumulative repeat and repeats per repeater) the
asymptotic and exponential growth parameters are significant at the
ten percent level. This indicates that later entrants achieve lower
asymptotic results but at a faster rate than early entrants. The
pattern of growth is analogous to the share patterns and is shown
in table 3 for twelve five week periods.
The elasticities of price, promotion, distribution, and
advertising are all significant in the share equation with
distribution and promotion being most responsive. The trial
behavior is similar and the repeat models show low significance and
mixed results.
Eighty nine percent of the dummy variables are significant at
the ten percent level. An ANOVA analysis indicates significant
differences across the brand constants (F (16,51) = 6.14 and
4 Note that the slope of the share ratios for later entrants
is not higher for all periods relative to the earlier entrants, but
they do grow at a faster rate in terms of proportion of their
asymptote.
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Table 3: Trial and Repeat Ratios for Later Entrants With Price,
Promotion, Advertising and Distribution Equal to Pioneer
a) Estimated Trial Ratio (5
Time Entry 2 Entry 3
1 0.240 0.207
2 0.472 0.390
3 0.549 0.451
4 0.588 0.481
5 0.611 0.500
6 0.626 0.512
7 0.637 0.521
8 0.646 0.527
9 0.652 0.532
10 0.657 0.536
11 0.662 0.540
12 0.665 0.543
Week Time Periods)
Entry 4 Entry 5
0.183
0.339
0.391
0.417
0.433
0.443
0.451
0.456
0.461
0.464
0.467
0.469
0.166
0.304
0.350
0.373
0.387
0.396
0.403
0.408
0.412
0.415
0.417
0.419
b) Estimated Cumulative Percent of Triers Who Repeat (5 Week Time
Periods)
Time E
1 0
2 0
3 0
4 0
5 0
6 0
7 0
8 0
9 0
10 0
11 0
12 0
ntry 2
.105
.490
.618
.682
.721
.746
.765
.778
.789
.798
.805
.810
c) Estimated Repeats Per Repeater (5
Time Entry 2 Entry 3 Entry 4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
0.179
0.555
0.680
0.743
0.781
0.806
0.824
0.837
0.847
0.856
0.863
0.868
0.203
0.548
0.663
0.721
0.755
0.778
0.795
0.807
0.816
0.824
0.830
0.836
0.212
0.540
0.649
0.703
0.736
0.758
0.774
0.785
0.794
0.802
0.808
0.813
Week Time Periods)
L Entry 5
0.216
0.532
0.637
0.690
0.721
0.742
0.757
0.769
0.777
0.784
0.790
0.795
18
Entry 3
0.209
0.509
0.609
0.659
0.689
0.709
0.723
0.734
0.742
0.749
0.754
0.759
Entry 4
0.244
0.505
0.592
0.635
0.661
0.678
0.691
0.700
0.707
0.713
0.718
0.722
Entry 5
0.259
0.496
0.575
0.615
0.638
0.654
0.665
0.674
0.680
0.686
0.690
0.694
-luYe
significant at the 1% level), but no significant differences across
the models (F (3,64) = 1.22 and not significant at' the 10% level).
The variables appear to capture meaningful brand specific effects,
but the variation evident by inspection suggests that more than
quality effects may be represented in the coefficients.5
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Asymptotic Order of Entry Penalties
The reported analysis indicates substantial order of entry
penalties for market share. Table 4 gives the asymptotic estimates
for share in 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 brand markets based on the order
of entry penalty parameter of -. 4 . Substantial rewards are
granted by the market for early entry. Late entrants should expect
lower shares unless they market their products more aggressively or
have better quality. If a firm is contemplating entry in a
category, equation one can be used to calculate the effects of
alternate advertising, price, distribution, and promotion. For
example it is doubtful that the 3rd brand to enter can justify the
same advertising as the first brand. The share reduction due to
lower advertising can be estimated by equation one. If the
advertising and promotion of the third entrant is .65 of the first
brand, price is equal to the pioneer, and distribution is .9 of the
first entrant, the long run share potential is 22%
5 Dropping the dummy variables in the share equation reduces
the R square from .90 to .85 and the asymptotic share parameter
increases in magnitude from -. 39 to -.66. This suggests the
estimates with dummies is conservative with respect to estimating
the order of entry penalty.
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Table 4: Order of Entry
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th
100
57 43
Market 42 32 26
Share 34 26 22 18
29 22 18 16 15
25 19 16 15 13 12
23 17 15 13 12 11 9
rather than 26% and the weekly market share is reduced
proportionally in each period.
The statistical analysis of trial and repeat models indicates
that the overall order of entry penalty is manifest in trial, first
repeat, and subsequent repeat purchase behavior. Schmalensee
(1982) modeled the source of order advantage based on the notion
that once buyers use the first entrant's product, they will be
unwilling to buy second entrant without a price concession because
they are not certain the second product will work. This would
suggest the order effect will be seen only on trial. A number of
authors (Hauser and Shugan 1983, Lane 1980, and Prescott and
Visscher 1977) suggest that if the early entrant takes the premier
positioning in a space of heterogeneous preferences, the later
entrants will have to settle for lower shares. This again suggests
a trial penalty. It would not posit a repeat order effect because
those consumers who try the product do it because the product does
match their preferences and we therefore would expect to have
normal repeat rates.
20
Horsky and Mate (1988) find an order of entry advantage in the
initial purchases of consumer durables due to goodwill generated by
the larger stock of previous adopters possessed by first entrants.
Such a trial effect also could be true in packaged goods if
diffusion phenomena are present.
Carpenter and Nakamoto's experimental work (1989) suggests
that early entrants enjoy an advantage by influencing the
preference structure so that it favors the pioneer in situations in
which preferences are ambiguous (not well formed attribute
importances). If this is true, the preference structure (brand
attribute weights and ideal points) could favor early entrants in
both trial and repeat behavior. Hoch and Ha (1986) argue repeat
purchasing reinforces judgements that state that the early entrants
have preferred attribute combinations. Samuelson and Zeckhauser
(1988) suggest that the risk and utility argument proposed by
Schmalansee may persist because the utility of the status quo is
greater than other alternative choices if consumers do not have
fully formed beliefs.
Carpenter and Nakamoto (1989) also identify the
prototypicality of the pioneer as another source of advantage. If
the pioneer becomes the prototype of the new category customers may
use it as a cognitive referent and the brand can gain accessibility
advantages in memory. Such superiority in a schema in memory is an
advantage (Sujan 1985) that could affect trial and repeat behavior.
Other principles of generalized learning can produce similar
phenomena (Alba and Hutchinson 1981, Marks and Olsen 1981, and
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Meyer 1986). Kardes and Gurumurthy (1990) find in a behavioral
experiment that pioneers benefit from more extensive recall of
attribute information that is transferred to a persistent
attitudinal advantage over later entrants.
Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990) argue that an order of entry
advantage can accrue from the consumers' decision to include a
brand in the their consideration sets. As more brands enter, the
value of adding another brand decreases so earlier entrants are
likely to be in more customers consideration sets. This advantage
particularly would affect repeat purchase rates.
Our work provides evidence of order effects on both trial and
repeat and many behavioral phenomena could explain this.
Behavioral experimentation is needed to isolate the determinants of
these effects, the relative importance of each of the determinants,
and the product situations wh3re they operate.
Rate of Approach to Asymptote
The results on the dynamics of the order effects are mixed.
The share equation identifies significant parameters that suggest
later entrants approach lower levels of share but at a faster speed
(see Table 2a and Figure one for the share dynamics and asymptotes
based on the share parameter estimates and the price, promotion,
distribution, and advertising equal to the pioneer). In the trial
model, however, we do not find significant dynamic effects, while
the cumulative first repeat and repeat per repeater models show
significantly faster approaches to lower levels of repeat for later
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entrants. We would have expected the trial dynamics to be
significant because it is a large part of the overall share
behavior of a new product. More empirical analysis is needed to
clarify this question. It may be that the mixed result in the
trial and repeat equations is due to the five week basis of the
data for these estimations. Larger sample sizes and improved
nonlinear estimation algorithms may be needed. Given the available
evidence in this paper either there is no difference in the
approach to the lower asymptotic share, trial, and repeat values or
later entrants approach a lower asymptote at a faster rate.
Future Research
In addition to the need for the statistical and behavioral
experimentation analyses indicated above, it would be desirable to
extend the models to include the effects of entry on price,
promotion, advertising and distribution. If later entry is
significantly correlated to the level of these variables, it may
indicate the order of entry penalty is not innate, but rather due
to later entrants charging higher prices and having lower
promotion, advertising, and distribution levels. Entry penalties
may also be affected by the defensive reactions of pioneers rather
than the basic market granted advantage. Although Robinson (1988)
finds limited competitive reactions in his analysis of 199 entrants
in new start business areas, it would be worth examining the
phenomena in our consumer packaged goods data. A simultaneous
equation extension of our model to include competitive reactions
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and entry on marketing mix variables is needed.6 Such a model
would allow a comparison of the results to Robinson and Fornell's
(1985) simultaneous modeling of consumer durable and nondurable
goods data obtained from the PIMS business level data base.
Brown and Lattin (1990) have hypothesized and find "head
start" advantages (e.g. prototyping) for pioneers related to the
number of months one proceeds another in the market. In our
analysis we did not include the time between entrants as a variable
because we did not have a reliable measure of when the previous
brand had entered if it entered before the beginning date of our
UPC data was available (October 31, 1983). We had only 18 brands
in the data base and in eight cases the previous brand entered
before October 1983. Based on the UPC measures and rough estimates
we got for the ten brands (we asked brand managers and examined
advertising initiation), we found no significant effect for the
time between entries. If a larger longitudinal data base were
available we could examine this effect more accurately. The
presence of national UPC data bases such as INFOSCAN should make
this kind of estimation possible in the future.
It would be interesting to test the share model on consumer
durables, industrial products, and services to see if order of
entry penalties are evident. Data may be difficult to collect, but
ethical pharmaceuticals could provide a fertile empirical data
base. Cross category differences in the order of entry effect must
6 See Gurumuthy Kalyanaram and Glen L. Urban (1990) for
preliminary exploratory results.
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be examined and an appropriate behavioral mechanism to explain
these cross category differences must be studied. We are not able
to undertake such a study in our data base because we do not have
enough data within any one category to obtain convergence of the
non-linear share or trial or repeat models. Much remains to be
done in calibrating the size of the advantages of early entry, the
determinants of such effects, and when they can be expected to
occur.
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